Yesterday Australian media reported a bloke is being charged with being a mercenary or some shit:
Mr Little, 45, was charged with preparatory acts for incursion into foreign states and trained or drilled for incursions into foreign states, under laws which prevent Australian citizens from engaging in hostile acts against other countries.
Mr Little was allegedly preparing to goto West Papua to join nationalist insurgents/terrorists. See : Man faces ‘foreign incursion’ offences, Amy Remeikis, The Age, December 5, 2012 | Alleged would-be mercenary faces Brisbane court, Jason Rawlins, ABC, December 5, 2012.
Today, The Australian (West Papua rebel outed on Facebook, Sarah Elks, December 6) reports that Little was one of umpteen would-be revolutionaries to be let-down by Zuckerberg. Further:
Magistrate Jacqui Payne agreed to deny bail, but ruled that it was because he posed “an unacceptable risk” of reoffending and of fleeing Australia. She said the [C]rown’s case was powerful, backed by his “strong statements of commitment” to West Papuan independence from Indonesia posted on Facebook.
For the record, I think all states are super.
West Papua has been under Indonesian occupation since 1969, when the delightfully named Act of Free Choice took place. As in the case of East Timor, the Australian state has been an enthusiastic supporter of Indonesian colonialism, but some other bloke reckons that’s changing (Australia’s evolving position on West Papua, Tom Clarke, The Australian, November 30, 2012). Of related interest is this article by Bobby Anderson (Living without a state, Inside Indonesia, November 25, 2012):
Indonesian Papua is not a uniform entity. When outsiders think of Papua, they imagine provincial and national-level political conflicts and protests against Indonesian rule. But this is only the reality for a minority of Papuans in the major towns of Jayapura, Wamena, and Timika, and their suburbs. Outside of select groups within these areas, most people do not engage in political issues related to referendum protests, dialogue with Jakarta, or Merdeka (independence).
Instead, local fissures count more in day-to-day politics. In the province, most people’s primary loyalties are not to an idea of ‘Papua’, nor are contending loyalties to ‘Indonesia’. Instead, most people are above all loyal to their clan, with even broader tribal loyalties being secondary. Loyalties to Papua or Indonesia come a distant third, at best. Whilst Jayapura and Wamena host numerous and often competing groups who agitate for independence, and while a few areas such as Puncak Jaya host active insurrectionists, most of rural Papua is an underdeveloped and detached space where political conflicts are entirely local.
In most places outside of the towns, the key issue is not that Papuans reject the Indonesian state: it is simply that the state plays little or no role in their lives, for better or for worse.
Unlike the Fuzzy Wuzzy Angels, Australia’s commitment to Israel appears to have remained rock-solid over the last few decades, with few if any deviations:–one minor exception being the recent decision by Joolya’s mob to abstain from (rather than oppose) a vote at the UN to allow Palestine to be accorded the same status as Vatican City. Curiously, last week the ABC reported that Australian Zionists have been training to go fight for Israel (including by way of running around Bondi beach: Aussie Zionists training to fight for Israel, Tom Tilley, November 29, 2012).
This kinda training is super, however, because statism.
See also : Fredy Perlman, The Continuing Appeal of Nationalism, 1984.